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EXPORT LICENSING: UNCOORDINATED
TRADE REPRESSION
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent history of United States export regulation can be
divided into two major segments-the period of administration
under the Export Control Act' of 1949, and the period under its
successor, the Export Administration Act2 enacted in 1969. The
Export Control Act (ECA) was a major step toward compensation
regulation of exports after the stringent controls adopted in
response to specific problems following World War II. The enact-
ment of the Export Administration Act (EAA) in 1969 marked a
loosening of trade controls over its predecessor, the ECA. The Ex-
port Administration Act is scheduled to expire in September of
1979.4 Criticism of the EAA in view of contemporary trade condi-
tions suggests that we may be on the threshold of a third major
segment in export regulation. An opportunity exists for a fun-
damental reassessment of United States export policy to balance
the interests of American business and government.
This Note will examine export licensing with primary analysis
being given to the existing licensing mechanisms of the Export
Administration Act. The Note has four major sections: (1) an ex-
planation of the relationship of world political and military events
to United States export policy; (2) a review of the procedures for
export licensing under the EAA; (3) a discussion of the im-
pediments to exportation posed by the present licensing scheme
and suggestions for improvements in light of existing political and
trade conditions; and (4) consideration of procedural reforms need-
ed to protect the interests of exporters applying for export
licenses.
II. RECENT HISTORY OF UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL
POLICY
The development of United States export control regulations
following World War II has been primarily in response to the ex-
pansion of the political and military influence of the Soviet Union.
50 U.S.C. app. § 1-44 (1968).
50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-13 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
See Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present and Future, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 791 (1967).
' 50 U.S.C. app. § 2413.
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However, besides reflecting the evolving relationship between the
United States and communist countries, export regulations have
been influenced by the declining post-war role of the United
States as a key source of strategic commodities and military hard-
ware.
5
United States concern with protection of national security
against communist advances became focused in 1948 with the com-
munist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade.6 In 1949
the Export Control Act was enacted as a temporary measure
responding to the mounting "Cold War" between the United
States and the Soviet Union.7 The ECA was the first comprehen-
sive scheme for the regulation of exports during peacetime.' The
objectives of the licensing restrictions of the ECA were to pre-
vent depletion of items in short supply and to insure that the
Soviet Union and other communist countries did not receive goods
with military or strategic significance. Prior to the ECA in 1949,
export controls were imposed only in response to war or specific
emergency situations.9 The ECA was renewed in 1951 with the
United States entry into the Korean War.10
Another development in 1951 was the enactment of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Control Act" (the Battle Act), which attemp-
ted to impose broad restraints on military and strategic exports
from the free world to communist countries. It did so by providing
for the denial of military, economic and financial assistance from
the United States to countries which permitted the sale of items
controlled by Battle Act lists to embargoed destinations.12 Specific
'See Berman and Garson, note 3 supra.
Id. at 795-96.
H.R. REP. No. 524, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [statement of Congressman Ashley],
reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2707.
' Berman & Garson, supra note 3, at 794. Legislation enacted prior to the ECA, the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. 1 et seq. (1970), authorizes the Presi-
dent to prohibit all private financial and commercial dealings with United States enemies
and their allies during time of war or any period of national emergency. In recent times
these provisions have been applied to trade with North Korea, North Vietnam and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (the Act no longer applies to China). Section 5(b) of the Act provided
the interim basis for continuation of export controls upon lapse of the EAA in 1971 and
again in 1976, see Executive Order No. 11940.
Berman & Garson, supra note 3, at 793.
10 The Export Control Act was subsequently renewed in 1956, 1958, 1960, and 1962. ICE at
799.
" 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611 et seq. (1970). The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act permits
the United States government to embargo shipments of arms, ammunition, implements of
war, nuclear materials, petroleum and other strategic items to nations where export of such
items would threaten the security of the U.S.
" Id. § 1612b.
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licensing controls on the export of arms, ammunition and other im-
plements of war were provided for in 1954 by the Mutual Security
Act.18
International cooperation for the control of commodities with
strategic significance was undertaken simultaneously with the
passage of the ECA in 1949. Representatives of seven free world
countries" compiled embargo lists of strategic goods, and, in 1950
a representative body known as the Coordinating Committee, or
COCOM, was established to review and develop these lists.8
Because COCOM was not formed through a multilateral treaty in-
dividual member governments remain responsible for domestic
legislation to effectuate the agreed upon international controls.
The Export Control Act was administered by the Department
of Commerce. The Battle Act and the Mutual Security Act were,
and continue to be, administered by the Department of State.
Other regulations relating to exporting fall within the jurisdiction
of the Treasury Department." It is apparent that during the
1950's export regulations were a response to strongly perceived
security dangers posed by the emerging Sino-Soviet communist
bloc. During the 1950's, the urgency of effective action to counter
this threat presented few challenges to multi-agency coordination
in administering export regulations.
While the United States embargo against communist countries
1" l § 1934 (1970). See 15 C.F.I. § 370, Supp. 11 (1978), for the currernt U.S. munitions
list. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. §§ 121 et seq., were
issued in 1972 pursuant to the Mutual Security Act. ITAR implements the President's
authority to control the import and export of arms, ammunition, and other implements of
war, including technical information concerning these items. See also the Arms Export Con-
trol Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (recommending no increase in authorized volume of sales of
defense articles) and § 2778 (granting authority to the President to define which items are
"defense articles" subject to licensing under 22 U.S.C. § 2751; see, 22 U.S.C. 2794, for defini-
tions).
" The countries initially involved in this cooperative effort were the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Berman &
Garson, supra note 3, at 834-35.
15 Id COCOM presently includes all NATO countries with the exception of Iceland, plus
Japan. See H.R. REP. No. 524 note 7 supra, at 2708. Section 2(2) of the Export Control Act
states:
it is the policy of the United States to formulate, reformulate and apply such con-
trols to the maximum extent possible in cooperation with all nations with which
the United States has defense treaty commitments, and to formulate a unified
commercial and trading policy to be observed by the non-communist dominated
nations or areas in their dealings with the communist dominated nations.
50 F.C.A. app. § 2022 (1966).
"i The Treasury is responsible for administering the Foreign Assets Control Regulations,
31 C.F.R. 500.101, et seq., and the Transaction Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 500.01 et seq.,
under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. I et seq.
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was moderately effective immediately following World War II,
three factors led to a reassessment of export policy during the
decade following 1960. First, the role of the United States as the
primary supplier of industrial and strategic goods had declined.
Second, cooperation among COCOM allies in voluntarily adhering
to the COCOM list had also declined." Third, despite efforts to in-
hibit communist military development it had become clear that
the Soviet Union had developed potent military-industrial
capability. 8 Although popular sentiment was that ". .. it would be
immoral for an American for the sake of profit to sell bullets
abroad that are going to be used against American boys in Viet-
nam or elsewhere,"'" it was clear the United States embargo
would not cause communist military forces to suffer a scarcity of
ammunition.20 In light of changed circumstances, pressure began
to mount, especially from the American business community, for a
liberalization of export restrictions.
The Export Control Act was scheduled to expire in 1969. Dur-
ing the twenty year period between 1949 and 1969 the premises
underlying United States export policy had changed considerably,
raising the necessity for a reassessment of existing legislation.
Several amendments to the Export Control Act were proposed,'
but Congress responded with new legislation-the Export Ad-
ministration Act.2
The new act did not abolish the export controls of the old ECA.
It was intended, however, to liberalize export restrictions to the
degree necessary to conform United States export policy to the
world trade situation produced by the dramatic changes which
had taken place over the past twenty years.'s It was believed that
1? Note, 12 VA. J. INTL L. 102 (1971).
, H.R. REP. No. 524, supra note 7, at 2708. Some take the view that the embargos impos-
ed had a counterproductive effect.
West European observers have seen embargo as playing into the hands of Stalin.
It enabled him to consolidate control in the Communist bloc and forced the small
East European countries closer to the Soviet Union. On balance, these observers
have seen embargo as resulting in the strengthening of the military-industrial
sector of the Communist bloc and therefore under the circumstances it was
welcome and advantages to the Kremlin.
14.
,Hearings on H.R. 4239 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (statement of Congressman Ashley).
* Note supra note 17, at 103.
" See generaUy id. at 104-10.
" 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401 et seq. (Cur. Supp. 1978).
n McQuade, U.S. Trade With Eastern Europe: Its Prospects and Parameters, 3 L. &
POL'Y INTL Bus. 43 (1971). McQuade notes four developments of previous decades which re-
quired adjustment: (1) the economic recovery of Western Europe and strengthened West
European security in relation to the Communist Countries; (2) growth "in the economic
[Vol. 9:333
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partial relaxation of restrictions under the new EAA would not
present a serious threat to the national security of the United
States in view of specific restraints which could be imposed under
the Mutual Security Act, the Trading with the Enemy Act and the
Battle Act.2'
The EAA was an attempt to balance remnants of Cold War
fears of Soviet military aggression with mounting pressure
toward more open East-West trade. An examination of the
mechanics of the EAA, as well as the administrative procedures
implementing the export licensing system, will help shed light on
how the EAA has balanced these interests.
III. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1969
A. Congressional Policy and Framework for Administration of
the Act
In the first section of the EAA the Congress states five find-
ings which clearly set out the need to balance security and foreign
policy interests on one hand with free trade on the other. The first
finding states that the quantity and composition of products
available at home and overseas "may affect the welfare of the
domestic economy and may have an important bearing upon fulfill-
ment of the foreign policy of the United States."" Building upon
this finding, the Congress states that, second, the national securi-
ty of the United States may be adversely affected if certain
materials which could make a significant contribution to the
military potential of other nations are exported without restric-
tions.' The final three findings weigh in favor of a loosening of
trade controls. The third finding notes that unwarranted restric-
tion of certain exports may adversely affect the balance of
payments situation, especially when restraints "are more exten-
sive than export restrictions imposed by countries with which the
United States has defense treaty commitments."' The fourth find-
strength of Eastern Europe and its confidence in its security vis-a-vis the West; (3) a shat-
tering of the appearance and reality of world unity among the Communist countries; and (4)
a decline in the rigid ideological assumptions held by the East and the West concerning
each other, coupled with the corresponding adjustments of conduct (though not always
rhetoric).
" See notes 8, 11, 13 supra.
" 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
" Id § 2401(1).
Id. § 2401(2).
n Id § 2401(3).
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ing recognizes that "uncertainty of policy" has curtailed business
efforts and impaired the United States balance of payments situa-
tion.' In the fifth finding it is noted that unreasonable restrictions
on access to supplies can cause political instability and retard the
development of nations8
These findings establish that regulation under the EAA should
balance a number of interests. The first two findings set out the
preeminent concern of the Congress for the advancement of the
foreign policy and national security interests of the United States.
The following findings, although more sensitive to the positive ef-
fects of free trade on domestic and foreign policy, are qualified to
remain subordinate to security concerns.
The difficulty in applying this and other balancing schemes
arises from the procedures and operational guidelines governing
the determination of the instances in which restraints will pro-
mote Congressional policy. The Congressional policy of the EAA is
to encourage trade except where it is determined by the Presi-
dent that a transaction would be against national interests, and to
restrict exports which would prove detrimental to national securi-
ty. 1 It could be inferred from this that Congress intended to
assure free trade except where reasonable grounds exist for
believing that a transaction would injure foreign policy or securi-
ty interests. However, it should be noted that the President is
granted broad discretion to make such determinations without
obligation to explain his conclusions to the exporter.82 Although
the initial motivation of Congress to enact the EAA was to
facilitate more liberal export trade, this objective is diluted by an
expansive deference to Presidential discretion.8
B. Delegation of Authority to the Executive
1. Development of the EAA
The section of the EAA concerning authority to implement ex-
" Id § 2401(4).
w Id § 2401(5).
I1 dL § 2402(1XB).
U See, e.g., note 51 supra and accompanying text.
U Id See also McQuade, note 23 supra, at 85-86. In comparing the language of the Export
Control Act of 1949 with the Export Administration Act of 1969, McQuade interprets some
policy statements as adding a flavor of trade promotion rather than trade repression, citing
several examples at footnote 178. However, McQuade notes that the House of Represen-
tatives prevailed in their orientation to the legislation as primarily for regulation and con-
trol, and not for purposes of trade expansion.
[Vol. 9:333
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port policy8' was one of the most heavily debated sections during
the 1969 Congressional hearings. As enacted, it remains one of the
most often criticized areas of the EAA. The first sub-section,
describing the duties of the Secretary of Commerce, has not
generated much discussion." Rather it has been the following sub-
section,' concerning the discretionary power of the President
over export policy, which has been a center of controversy., An
examination of the Congressional debate on this provision will ex-
plain the conflicting views.
In general, the House of Representatives and the Nixon Ad-
ministration favored extension of the Export Control Act, without
modification, for four more years, taking the position that trade
could be liberalized under the existing legislation.8' The Export
Control Act of 1949 vested authority in the President to control
export policy. House Bill 4293s' reflects the views of the Ad-
ministration by preserving full Presidential authority to control
exports for reasons of national security, foreign policy, and short
supply.'"
The Senate took a different position in Senate Bill 1940," in-
troduced for the purpose of encouraging trade promotion. S. 1940
placed a number of restrictions on the export control authority of
the President. Section 4(b) of the proposed S. 1940 required ex-
porters to obtain express permission2 to export an article only
when the President had determined that an item would be capable
of a significant military application which would impair the
national security and welfare of the United States. Section 4(c)
stated two criteria for determining when an item would require
express permission: (1) when the item would likely be
used for military purposes, and (2) when similar goods or
technology are not readily available to the importing country from
other sources. Moreover, it was explicitly provided that such per-
" 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Id. § 2403(aX)). This section obliges the Secretary of Commerce to take organizational
and procedural steps to implement the EAA, to periodically review the Commodity Control
List, to report concerning actions taken, and to inform the business community of changes
in export policy and procedures.
l Id. § 2403(bXl).
" See Berman & Garson, note 3 supra, at 792.
U McQuade, supra note 23, at 84.
" H.R. 4293, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
H.R. REP. No. 681, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969) (statement of Managers on the Part of
the House-Full Presidential Regulatory Authority Preserved).
S 5. 1940, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter S. 1940].
d This requirement of obtaining express permission means that the exporter would have
to procure a "validated license." See text in Section B. 2 of this Note infra
1979]
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mission would not be denied unless there was substantial
evidence that these criteria had been met.'8 This proposal would
have prohibited the President from denying applications in-
discriminately while continuing to provide protection for United
States national security.
The final version of this section of the EAA preserved the
broad discretionary authority of the President in administering
export controls, rejecting the Senate proposals. A damaging blow
was dealt to proponents of free trade by the new legislation on
this point."
2. 1977 Amendments
In 1977, Congress re-evaluated its position on the issue of
Presidential discretion and amended the EAA to include language
qualifying the President's discretionary authority." The EAA now
requires that a number of factors affecting export policy be taken
into account in license determinations in addition to the status of a
destination country as communist or non-communist." The EAA
states three factors which should be considered in determining ex-
port policy: (1) a country's present and potential relationship to
the United States, (2) its present and potential relationship to
countries friendly or hostile to the United States, and (3) its ability
and willingness to control retransfers of United States exports in
accordance with United States policy.4'
Another fundamental change made by the 1977 amendments re-
quires that the export by American sellers of goods freely
available outside the United States may be restricted only in
cases where the President has reason to believe that the absence
u See also S. 2696, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). This was another proposal for reform of
Presidential export control authority which was less restrictive than S. 1940. It provided
that notwithstanding Presidential inability to make a determination of whether an item
would be used for military purposes and that it was not available from other sources, the
President retained authority to restrict exports on national security grounds provided he
gave the Congress a detailed explanation of his action.
" Berman & Garson, supra note 3, at 792.
Probably no single piece of legislation gives more power to the President to con-
trol American Commerce. Subject only to the vaguest standards of 'foreign
policy' and 'national security and welfare,' he has authority to cut off the entire
export trade of the United States, or any part of it, or to deny 'export privileges'
to any or all persons.
Il
U Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 103, 91 Stat. 235
(amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(bX2XA) and (B)).
" 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b)(2XA).
41Id
340 [Vol. 9:333
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of controls would be detrimental to the security of the United
States." Although the legislative history of the amendment sug-
gests that this change was intended to reverse the presumption
against the imposition of validated license controls,'" the enact-
ment requires the exporter to establish the availability "without
restriction from sources outside the Untied States [of items] in
significant quantities and comparable in quality of those produced
in the United States .. . ."I Even where this is established, con-
trols may be imposed for overriding reasons of national security
which are required to be disclosed only through annual reports by
the President to Congress."
In addition to delegating authority to the President to control
export policy, the EAA provides that "[tihe President may
delegate the power, authority, and discretion conferred upon him
by this Act to such department, agencies, or officials of the
Government as he may deem appropriate."52 Therefore, not only
does the EAA delegate authority to the President, but the Act
also permits the President to disperse operational accountability
for export policy among various executive agencies. Presently
there are several agencies involved in the adminstration of export
licensing, each of which represents a specific governmental in-
terest or expertise with respect to particular exports.5 A survey
of the licensing process will suggest the advantages and disadvan-
tages of multi-agency participation.
C. Structure of Export Licensing under the EAA
1. The Office of Export Administration
The Secretary of Commerce, to whom has been delegated the
responsiblity of implementing the policy of the EAA,5' has cen-
tralized the management and administration of this responsibility
in the Office of Export Administration (OEA)."
The EAA obligates the OEA to consult with other executive
agencies in the development of policies and operations having
" Id § 2403(bX2)B).
0 H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 362, 369. [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 190].
" 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(bX2XB) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
81 Id
U Id § 2403(e).
" See text accompanying note 57, infra
50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(aX1) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
U See Exec. Order No. 12,002, 42 Fed. Reg. 35623 (1977).
1979]
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substantial bearing on exports.5M Thus, the export licensing com-
munity consists not only of the Department of Commerce but also
a group of consulting departments and agencies. The Comptroller
General has described this community as follows:
[t]he principal consulants are the Departments of Defense,
Energy, State and to a lesser extent the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. The Central Intelligence Agency
serves as an intelligence advisor to the licensing community and
does not normally make formal recommendations on license ap-
plications. Any other agency that has special technical
knowledge considered pertinent to a particular export license
application .... also gives technical advice when asked to do
SO.
5 7
With exceptions to be noted in Part D., below, the bulk of
license applications are determined by the OEA. The Congres-
sional requirement that the OEA consult with other departments
is employed only in cases where there is a possible intragovern-
mental controversy over whether exportation of a particular item
should be permitted. 9 In the event of disagreement among par-
ticipating agencies, an interagency review hierarchy is im-
plemented.
2. Export Licenses
All exports from the United States require government
authorization. However, because of the great volume of com-
modities exported from the United States it would be expensive
and inefficient to require all license applications to be subjected to
OEA scrutiny.w Therefore the Export Administration Regula-
tions, 1 promulgated by the OEA, provide for two basic types of
licenses: general" and validated."
50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
" COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, THE ADMINIATRATION OF UNITED STATES
EXPORTS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO INDUSTRY 3 (Oct. 31, 1978)
[hereinafter 1978 COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT].
0 See note 56 supra.
McIntyre, Survey of the Licensing Process under the Export Administration Act 32
(1978) (unpublished paper on file at the Dean Rusk Center for International and Com-
parative Law, Athens, Georgia).
" A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 158 (W. Survey & C.
Shaw eds., 2d ed, 1977).
61 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1978).
Id. § 371 (1978).
I ld. § 372 (1978).
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The regulations specifically grant authority to export certain
commodities and technical data to designated country groups."
Items which are among those listed may be exported without for-
mal approval by the Department of Commerce under what is
termed a general license. Although no formal application is re-
quired, an exporter shipping under a general license must file a
Shipper's Export Declaration."
If shipment of particular goods is not permitted under these
regulations, i.e., if a general license is unavailable, or if the goods
are restricted by the Commodity Control List (discussed in the
next section), then the exporter must apply for a validated
license." A validated license is a formal authorization permitting
the exporter to ship a specified commodity to a named consignee in
a particular country for a designated use. 7 There are various
types of validated licenses which can be applied for;" however, the
purpose of the application in every case is to require the exporter
"to make the fullest disclousre of all parties and interests to the
transaction.""
Compliance with the licensing procedure and issuance of a
license does not guarantee that a shipment will thereafter be
beyond regulation. The government reserves the right to revise,
suspend or revoke all licenses without notice. 0 If a shipment is
already enroute, the government may recall the items and order
them unloaded. 1
3. Regulated Commodities
The Commodity Control List (CCL),72 issued by the OEA,
prescribes those items which cannot be exported without the is-
"Id § 370, Supp. 1 (1978). In this section the countries falling within each country group
are listed. See generally 15 C.F.R. § 371, for an explanation of which products can be ex-
ported to which countries under a general license.
" Id § 371.2(a). This document describes the commodity being exported and provides the
names and addresses of the exporter and the receiving party. See also 50 U.S.C. app. §
2405, dealing with violations and penalites.
" Id. § 370.3(a).
" Id § 372.2(a). See also § 379.5 for special technical data provisions.
0 Id § 372.2(b). See also § 373 which specifies the licensing procedures applicable to
validated licenses other than those obtained for an individual transaction. The purpose of
these special procedures is to facilitate exportation in cases of extended or reoccuring tran-
sactions by allowing the exporter to obtain a license covering a series of related transac-
tions.
" Id § 372.3(a). See also § 372.6(b) for a detailed explanation of the information the appli-
cant is required to provide.
Id. § 370.3(b).
"Id
Id § 399.1.
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suance of a validated license. A commodity is placed on the CCL
when the Department of Commerce, usually in conjunction with
advice received from other departments, determines that it is
necessary to evaluate such commodity export applications on a
case-by-case basis.
The current CCL, as published in the Export Administration
Regulations, is incorporated by reference into the Code of Federal
Regulations."3 Modifications of the CCL are made informally
because administration of the EAA is exempt from the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.' The Department of Commerce is not
required to publish modifications of the CCL which may be under
consideration, or to provide for general public comment. Changes
in the CCL are disclosed in the Export Administration Bulletin."
The exporting community is given an opportunity to express its
views concerning the contents of the CCL through the Technical
Advisory Committees, which are established by the Department
of Commerce upon request from producers of items subject to ex-
port controls .7  Each committee is composed of representatives
from government and industry.77 The EAA requires that
"[mlembers of the public shall be give a reasonable opportunity,
pursuant to the regulations .... to present evidence to such com-
mittees."" However, the regulations permit participation to be
limited to written statements and allow meetings to be declared
"closed," thereby substantially limiting public input.' As of March
1, 1979, there were six Technical Advisory Committees." In view
of the numerous exporting interests in the United States, the low
number of active committees suggests that this avenue of in-
dustry participation has not been attractive to private exporters.
7s Id
7' 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
7' 15 C.F.R. § 399.1(c) (1978). See § 399.2(c) which states that the Commodity Interpreta-
tions will also be published in the Export Administration Regulations and revisions will ap-
pear in the Export Administration Bulletin.
,s 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978); 15 C.F.R. § 390.1 (1978).
" 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c)(1).
7 Id § 2404(c)(2).
7' See 15 C.F.R. § 390.1(f) (1978), providing that members of the public may freely submit
written statements. However, in order to deliver an oral statement a request must be made
in advance and will be granted only if time permits. Additionally, public input at any par-
ticular meeting may be prohibited if a determination is made that the meeting should be
"closed." If the meeting is "open," members of the public may attend, but generally they
may not participate or ask questions.
' COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, EXPORT CONTROLS: NEED TO CLARIFY
POLICY AND SIMPLIFY ADMINISTRATION 20 (Mar. 1, 1979) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER GENERAL].
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4. Multilateral Controls: The COCOM Embargo Lists
The main purpose of COCOM8' "is to achieve parallel ad-
ministration of export controls"8 2 among member nations.
However, COCOM is not the product of a formal treaty and the
embargo list which it promulgates is enforced only by voluntary
implementation through national legislation.'
Initially, COCOM adopted policies which were in accord with
United States views concerning which commodities should be con-
trolled for strategic reasons. A major reason for the leadership of
United States policy in this area at one time was because those
countries which comprise COCOM are subject to the aid termina-
tion provisions of the Battle Act." With the continuing economic
recovery of these countries of World War II receded into the past,
the aid limitations of the Battle Act declined as an effective bar-
gaining tool, and United States influence in COCOM decision-mak-
ing eroded."
The United States continues to play a major role in COCOM,
and it has been asserted that the United States continues to envi-
sion itself as "the conscience of COCOM."'' However, other
COCOM countries consider the export policy of the United States
to be overly restrictive and anticompetitive.' This results in dif-
ferent ideas on which items should be controlled as well as dif-
ferences in interpretation concerning the application of those ex-
port controls which have been agreed upon.
5. Relationship Between the Commodity Control List and the
COCOM List
The items listed on the Commodity Control List (CCL) and the
COCOM list (COCOM) have never been closely coordinated.' Ac-
'l See discussion of COCOM at text accompanying note 15 supra.
U President's Report to Congress on Multilateral Export Controls, July 10, 1978,
reprinted in U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY, July 18, 1978 at N-1.
u DEPARTMENT OF STATE. THE BATTLE ACT REPORT 1973 1 (26th Report to Congress 1974);
Dept. of State Publ. 8765.
" See discussion of Battle Act at text accompanying notes 11 and 12 supra.
U COMPTROLLER GENERAL. supra note 80, at 8. As early as 1957 it was evident that United
States ability to influence COCOM policy through the Battle Act was dissipating. During
that year a COCOM country violated the COCOM embargo and the other COCOM members
concurred, notwithstanding the fact that the United States was providing significant levels
of aid to a number of members. Id.
SId. at 9.
"Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Trade & Commerce of the House Comm. on Int'l Rel, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1976)
[hereinafter Export Licensing].
" H.R. REP. No. 524 supra note 7. at 2707-08.
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cording to the General Accounting Office the United States con-
trols the export of 143 categories of industrial items; 105 in com-
mon with the other COCOM members and 38 on a unilateral
basis." These unilateral restrictions by the Untied States continue
even though the Congress, in 1977 revisions to the EAA, indicated
its clear policy against denial of export authorization when an
item is freely available on foreign markets."
This disparity has been criticized on two major grounds. First,
the objective of developing a COCOM list was to reflect a consen-
sus by members on which strategic items required export con-
trols. Second, it is unreasonable for the United States to restrict
items in addition to those on the COCOM list because those items
can be sold by businesses in other COCOM countries.91 Represen-
tatives of American business interests have suggested that the
United States should limit the requirement of a validated license
to those items requring COCOM approval,9 and elevate the
COCOM agreement to treaty status to compel all COCOM
members to enforce the list in the same manner as the United
States."
The COCOM list is revised every two to three years, providing
the United States with periodic opportunities to review the CCL
as well. By doing so, the CCL could be conformed to the views of
our COCOM allies. Unfortunately, the United States has not taken
advantage of these opportunities, and continues to maintain the
existing dual control system."
In the situation where the OEA tentatively approves a
validated license for an item included on the COCOM list, the
Office of East-West Trade of the Department of State is required
to request an exception from COCOM. If approved, this petition
will "exempt an item on a one time basis from international con-
" COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 80, at 18.
" 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403b(2XB) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
" Hoya, Changing U.S. Regulation ofEast-West Trade, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 11
(1973). Hoya notes the reply to these arguments. First, the United States is the strongest
country in the free world, and it has a duty to protect "world security that goes beyond the
responsibility of its COCOM allies." Second, because American technological capacity is uni-
quely advanced, an American embargo is tantamount to an East-West embargo.
" Export Administration Act. Agenda for Reform, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Econ. Poly & Trade of the House Comm. on Int'l Rel, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (Oct. 4,
1978) (statement of George Bardos).
" Id at 22 (statement of James Gray).
" This failure to synchronize review of the CCL with the review of the COCOM list may
result in part from the fact that the Secretary of State is responsible for representing the
United States position in COCOM, while the CCL is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Commerce. See Export Licensing, note 87 supra, at 7-9.
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trol, thus permitting its sale." ' In order for an exception request
to be granted, representatives of the member states of COCOM
must unanimously approve the petition."
D. Administration of Export Licensing under the Export
Administration Act
Applications for validated export licenses" are received by the
Operations Division of the OEA, where they are examined first
for completeness. If documents supporting the application are in-
sufficient, the application will be returned to the exporter for
clarification. The Compliance Division is occasionally requested to
verify statements made in the application when officials suspect
possible violation of the Export Administration Regulations.
If the application is complete and the exporter is not presently
being penalized for previous violations of export regulations, the
application is referred for technical screening to the appropriate
product-oriented Licensing Division. There are four divisions to
which the application may be channelled: (1) Computers, (2)
Capital Goods and Production Materials, (3) Electronics and (4)
Short Supply. If it is determined at this point that the item
presents no threat to foreign policy or national security and that
exportation will not create a short supply of the particular com-
modity, then the license may be approved without referral to
another agency. Generally, licenses are issued at this phase in the
decision-making process with respect to common items destined
for free world countries. This step completes the process of ob-
taining a license for ninety percent of the applications filed with
the OEA."
The remaining ten percent of applications are advanced another
step to the Policy Planning Division (PPD). The PPD is divided in-
to two branches. The Special Programs Branch is assigned ap-
plications covering items destined for free world countries which
were not approved by the Licensing Division. The East-West
Trade Branch handles applications for items going to communist
countries. At this phase of the decision-making process the OEA
has a measure of discretion.
U COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 80, at 10.
" Id. at 15. Members may also obtain what is called an "administrative exception" for
selected items by simply notifying the COCOM officials.
" It should be recalled that no formal approval is required for items included in regula-
tions granting "general" export licenses. See notes 64 and 65 and accompanying text supra.
" See Export Licensing, note 87 supra, at 33.
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Review by the Department of Defense is required under the
EAA when the item is destined for "a country to which exports
are restricted for national security purposes."" If it is determined
that the item would make a significant contribution to the military
potential of a country, and that this would be detrimental to the
national security of the Untied States, the Department of Defense
can exercise a statutory veto power to deny license approval.'0° If
the commodity is not one which falls under the mandatory review
of the Department of Defense under the EAA, 10 then in some
cases the PPD may itself determine whether a license should be
approved on the basis of interagency guidelines."2
If the PPD believes that interagency consultation is necessary,
it may follow either of two possible avenues. First, it may refer
the application informally by a "waiver memo" to the appropriate
agencies directly concerned. If the PPD and the agencies con-
sulted cannot agree on a disposition of the application the PPD
must take a second route and refer the application to the
Operating Committee (OC). In some cases the PPD may believe
that formal consideration by the OC is warranted, and will refer
the application to that body in the first instance.1 8 Thus, there are
two circumstances in which an application will be subjected to for-
mal review by the Operating Committee: (1) when the PPD is
unable to make a decision on the basis of established agency
guidelines and, after referral, the agencies consulted cannot reach
agreement, and (2) when the PPD believes that the application in-
volves issues which are so fundamental or controversial that ex-
tensive consideration is required.
Once the machinery of the OC is called into play a formal proc-
ess of multi-agency participation commences. This process may
eventually involve five administrative levels: (1) the Operating
Committee, (2) the sub-Advisory Committee for Export Policy
(sub-ACEP), (3) the full Advisory Committee for Export Policy
50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(h) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
10 See id § 2403(hX2), which requires the Secretary of Defense to determine, in consulta-
tion with the OEA, the types and categories of licenses which should be reviewed by
Defense.
"' With specific items which would ordinarily be subject to review by the Department of
Defense, Defense may delegate its power to review back to Commerce's OEA.
'o" See McIntyre, Interagency Decision Making Process 9 (Cot. 1978) (unpublished paper
on file at the Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law, Athens, Georgia).
10 McIntyre, Accommodating Economic, Security and Political Interests in an Interagency
Review Process? The Export Licensing Case 5 & 8 (Paper presented to the 40th Nat'l Cong.
of the Am. Soc'y for Pub. Ad., Baltimore, Md., Apr. 1-4, 1979; on file at the Dean Rusk
Center for International and Comparative Law, Athens, Georgia). Recent studies show that
of the more than 60,000 applications for validated licenses received by the OEA in 1977,
only 608 were submitted to the OC.
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(ACEP), (4) the Export Administration Review Board (EARB) and
(5) the President in conjunction with the National Security Coun-
cil.
The OC functions at the senior staff level. It is chaired by the
OEA's Assistant Director of Policy Planning, and meets weekly to
discuss export policy in general as well as individual applica-
tions.14 Senior staff from the Departments of Commerce, Defense,
State, Energy, Treasury, the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration, and the Central Intelligence Agency represent their
respective agencies at these meetings. Because of the secrecy
which surrounds OC proceedings there is some controversy con-
cerning which of these members are entitled to vote. However, it
is clear that the Departments of Commerce, Energy, State and
Defense are voting members.
When it is determined that OC review is necessary, the PPD
circulates copies of the application, supporting documents and
other relevant information to the OC representatives, who review
these materials within their individual agencies before the actual
OC meeting. At the meeting, each official participant is requested
to make a statement of opinion before the issues are discussed. If
any disagreement cannot be resolved, disposition of the particular
case may be deferred until a subsequent OC session. Eventually,
reports are compiled from each agency and sometimes from out-
side consultants, and the application is submitted to the OC for a
formal vote. The application can only be approved or denied by a
unanimous vote, and therefore each voting department has a veto
power. 05
Although in most instances the OC is able to resolve the case,
where the application is stalled as a result of irreconcilable dif-
ferences in policy, the application is forwarded to the sub-ACEP
level.? 6 The sub-ACEP body functions at the deputy assistant
secretary level. It usually meets on a montly basis"° and follows
essentially the same review procedures as the OC. Continuing
disagreement may necessitate review by the ACEP, which is com-
posed of assistant secretaries from the participating departments.
In the event that the case cannot be resolved at that level, the
case may require resolution by the Secretaries of Commerce,
"' Id at 8. The OC discusses approximately ten to fifteen applications at each meeting.
Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969: Hearings Before House Comm.
on Int'l ReL, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 315-16 (1976) (statement of the Domestic and Int'l Bus. Ad)
[hereinafter 1976 Hearings].
,o McIntyre, supra note 102, at 10.
107 Id.
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Defense, State and Treasury sitting as the EARB. The application
may ultimately be submitted for action by the National Security
Council and the President.08
It is apparent that this hierarchy for the implementation of the
EAA can greatly extend the time required to obtain a validated
license. The time involved will be a function of the characteristics
of the commodity itself, the country of destination, and the
number of agencies directly concerned with the license determina-
tion.
IV. IMPEDIMENTS TO EXPORTING IN THE LICENSING PROCESS
A. Administration of the EAA
The enactment of the EAA in 1969 was a response to requests
from American exporters to strike a new balance between
national economic interests and national security interests by
loosening export controls. Instead of proposing operational stan-
dards to balance these interests, the Congress attempted to
resolve this issue in the EAA by delegating broad discretion to
the President and requiring executive agencies to consult and
coordinate their policies when reviewing license applications. This
broad delegation of power invites confusion and, coupled with the
exclusion of the EAA from the Administrative Procedure Act, has
resulted in an unnecessary infringement upon the right of citizens
to engage in commerce.'"
There is a pressing need to clarify those foreign policies which
may be the basis for export controls in order to avoid unpredic-
table administration. Congress should take steps to limit the
discretion currently granted to the President by more clearly
defining the priority of foreign policies relevant to the administra-
tion of export controls.
In addition, a balanced approach to export regulation requires
that Congress state clearly the economic interests which are im-
plicated by export controls, and the weight that must be assigned
to such interests. Statutory commands alone, however, are insuffi-
cient to assure responsible administration of the law by the ex-
ecutive branch. If the Commerce Department and other involved
agencies and departments are to be accountable for their actions,
new procedures must be devised to open export regulation to con-
1 Export Licensing, supra note 87, at 72.
100 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Pol'y and Trade of the House Comm. on
Int'l ReL 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, Mar. 14, 1979 (statement of F. Huszagh, G. Bertsch & J.
McIntyre) [hereinafter 1979 Hearings].
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gressional and public oversight. Secrecy should be the exception
rather than the rule.
The combination of a broad delegation of authority to the Presi-
dent, exclusion of the EAA from the APA, and the undefined re-
quirement of interagency coordination has led to frequent
dissatisfaction by American exporters with inordinate time delays
and lack of agency accountability in licensing review. 0 In
response, Congress amended the EAA in 1977111 to require final
disposition of license applications within ninety days unless it is
determined that additional time is required. If this determination
is made, the applicant must be given written notice of the reasons
for delay and an opportunity to file a written response entitled to
full consideration.' This rule has not effectively reduced delay
due to the ambiguity of the authority of the OEA to determine
that additional time is required for evaluation of the application.'
These delays continue to impair the ability of American exporters
to compete successfully in the world market.'
In order to give greater coherence to export policy, regulatory
powers should be centralized in a single department or agency.
Centralization of authority would help reduce delays in the ap-
proval of applications. Centralization would also contribute to the
fairness of the procedure for considering license applications by
vesting the power of decision in a single body accountable to the
Congress with respect to licensing policy.
In anticipation of the expiration of the President's authority
under the Act in the Fall of 1979, both houses of Congress have
considered amendments which would accompany a renewal of
authority. Both the Senate bill, S. 737,115 and the House bill, H.R.
4034,11' would place greater emphasis on a trade expansion policy
and the need to consider the economic effects of export controls.
Only H.R. 4034, however, would substantially reform the pro-
cedures of export regulation.
Under H.R. 4034, the Secretary of Commerce would be required
to provide for continuous review of controlled commodities, and to
,10 Id. at 2.
' 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(g) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Id § 2403(gX2).
,, McIntyre supra note 102, at 15. See also 1979 Hearings, note 109 supra, at 3 for
statistical documentation of the gradual increase in the number of cases delayed for more
than ninety days.
"1 1979 Hearings, supra note 109, at 3. See also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Econ. Poly and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Aff., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (state-
ment of F. Huszagh) [hereinafter April X 1979 Hearings].
S 5. 737, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
' H.R. 4034, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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provide opportunity for comment by interested parties, similar to
that provided under the Administrative Procedure Act. Although
the power of the President to apply controls despite a finding of
foreign availability would be retained, the President would be re-
quired to provide a published statement of the reasons for his ac-
tion and the probable economic impact of the controls. The license
application process would be expressly required to comport with
basic standards of due process, and each exporter would be ap-
prised of the specific basis for the denial of any license application.
S. 737 lacks these procedural reforms, but would restrain the
use of foreign policy controls by incorporating a foreign availabili-
ty test similar to that applied to national security controls. Also, it
would require periodic reports to Congress by the President on
the need for continued foreign policy controls. Neither H.R. 4034
nor S. 737 in their present form would cure the present delay and
diffusion of authority in license processing.
B. Export Administration Regulations.
The Export Administration Regulations are by the nature of
their function specific, technical and, in places, complex. Recently
a "Plain English Project" was undertaken by the Department of
Commerce to simplify and clarify the Regulations in order to
make them more useful to exporters.
The single most heavily criticized portion of the Export Ad-
ministration Regulations is probably the CCL.117 The competitive
posture of American exporters is impaired because the govern-
ment has been slow to re-evaluate the continuing need for
validated licenses for specific items once they are placed on the
list.,"
C. Dual Lists of Controlled Items: CCL and COCOM Lists
Historically, the United States enjoyed a role of leadership over
the policies of COCOM. This position was in part due to the fact
that the United States was a leading producer of many strategic
commodities, which created a degree of harmony between the
COCOM control list and the CCL. Today, a number of COCOM
members increasingly can supply strategic commodities, a number
of which have not been added to the COCOM list although com-
11 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1978). See text accompanying notes 72-80 supra.
"' See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 80, at 20-21 which reports that while Congress
instructed that all items on the CCL be reviewed by Dec. 31, 1978 to determine if restric-
tions were still warranted, little progress has yet been made. See also 1979 Hearings, note
109 supra, at 10.
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parable items are controlled by the CCL. American exporters of
goods subject to validated licenses under the CCL but not on the
COCOM list suffer competitive disadvantage.11
New export legislation should require an immediate review of
the need for validated licenses with respect to controlled items
not presently on COCOM list. It may be generally presumed that
such items are freely available on foreign markets and continua-
tion of these items on the CCL should now be justified before Con-
gress.
A review of the items presently on the CCL will not diminish
the leadership role of the United States in controlling strategic
goods through COCOM. Rather, the competitive need for unifor-
mity of the CCL and the COCOM list underscores the need for the
U.S. to encourage other COCOM members to jointly determine
which items must be controlled as a means of mutual economic
and military security.
V. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF EXPORTERS
The existing procedures followed by government agencies
responsible for the enforcement of the Export Administration Act
have provided exporters with only an abbreviated form of the pro-
cess. The major reason that procedural rights now regarded as
fundamental in most forms of government regulation are denied
to exporters is because strategic export regulation under the
EAA is exempt from the requirements of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).' During the Congressional proceedings
leading to the enactment of the Export Control Act of 1949, ' ex-
tension of the APA to export regulation was discussed but re-
jected because export controls were then regarded as a tem-
porary measure."' Though export regulation has now become a
fixture in United States foreign trade law, basic procedural rights
have not yet been introduced under the Act.
Principal arguments raised by defenders of the limited input
and secrecy of the existing licensing process are, first, that na-
tional security would be jeopardized by a more open and cumber-
some procedure, and second, that export licensing requires policy
decisions for which hearings on individual applications are inap-
propriate."x Even the APA shows special deferrence to national
", Export Licensing, supra note 87, at 35. See also April 3, 1979 Hearings, note 114
aupra, at 2.
1* 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
m See text at note 1 supra.
x Berma & Garson, supra note 3. at 797-98.
IU See 1976 Hearings note 105 supra (statement of A. Downey).
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security matters by exempting from APA procedures all govern-
ment actions involving "the conduct of military or foreign affairs
functions."'" The unqualified exemption of foreign and military af-
fairs functions from the APA has not gone unchallenged. Many
commentators have questioned whether national security or
foreign policy is always at stake when an agency decision im-
plicates foreign or military affairs, and have argued that pro-
cedural safeguards should be sacrificed only when the threat to
security is real and significant.'25
Decisions made under the Export Administration Act often re-
quire a consideration of foreign policy, yet an individualized hear-
ing would be inappropriate to determine the relative importance
of foreign policy issues raised by an application. To the extent
that license denial is based on findings concerning alternative
foreign availability or the military adaptability of a product,
however, the critical question is one of fact rather than foreign
policy. If reasonable protection of sensitive government informa-
tion is provided for, a full hearing on questions of fact in disputed
applications would not disrupt the policy-making level of the ex-
port regulations process. Both the APA and judicial principles of
due process are sufficiently flexible standards to allow effective
individual input into the license application process, instead of deny-
ing a fair hearing in every instance.
Due process requires that persons threatened with a denial of
life, liberty or property by government action be afforded an op-
portunity to know the arguments and evidence opposing their in'
terests, and to make a defense of those interests through
counterarguments or cross-examination." The APA guarantees
these rights to parties affected by a federal agency in an ad-
judicative action.'27 Export licensing proceedings, however, are
conducted in the absence of the applicant, and the matters con-
sidered and the reasoning of the administering agencies is not
5 U.S.C. § 554(aX4) (1976).
See generally Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-making Under
the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 222 (1971); Timberg, Wante& Administrative Safeguards for the
Protection of the Individual in Economic Regulation, 17 AD. L. REV. 159 (1965).
For a more detailed due process analysis of export regulatory procedures, Note, Accoun-
tability and the Foreign Commerce Power: A Case Study of the Regulation of Exports, 9
GA.- J. INT'L & COmP. L., Issue No. 3 (1979).
IN Seegenerally L. TRIBE. AMERICA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 474-563 (1978).
5' U.S.C. §§ 554(b-(d), 556, 557 (1976). An adjudication, as distinguished from a rulemak-
ing action, is a proceeding which determines the legal consequences of past events. Id. §§
551(6), (7). This definition would not include the licensing function of the OEA, which has onr
ly prospective effect, but for the special provision that licensing decisions shall be regarded
as adjudications. Id § 551(6), (9).
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open to public or judicial scrutiny." The OEA has attempted to
provide applicants with summaries of arguments raised by other
agencies, so that the applicants will be able to make some
response.1" Unfortunately, this form of communication between
government and exporter has failed to achieve the advantages of
a face to face hearing. Because of the diffusion of authority under
the Act, the OEA has found it difficult to present applicants with
a complete exposition of the reasoning behind challenges raised
by other agencies." A break-down in communications is increas-
ingly likely as agencies more remote from the export industry
assume decision-making authority under the Act.181
Effective participation by exporters in licensing determinations
would rebuild the confidence of American exporters in this pro-
cess, and would enhance the reliabilty of licensing decisions by en-
couraging the submission of evidence by the party best ac-
quainted with the transaction under consideration. Where secrecy
is needed for reasons of national security, nondisclosure of
government information and ex parte proceedings could be con-
sidered as the exception rather than the rule.
The juduciary has been reluctant to invalidate the existing ex-
port regulation procedures because licensing decisions may in-
volve highly sensitive questions of policy or national security as
well as nonsensitive issues of fact.l Congressional action is
therefore required to create a licensing procedure which will
strike an open balance between due process and national security.
VI. CONCLUSION
The shift in the political and economic circumstances of United
States trade during the last thirty years calls for a more balanced
approach to the regulation of exports. Foreign trade is vital to the
13 See Daedalus Enterprises, Inc. v. Kreps, No. 78-893 (D.D.C. May 18, 1978) reprinted in
U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY. May 30, 1978, at 1-5, affd No. 78-1442 (D.C. Cir. May 25, 1978). The
trial court in Daedalus held that licensing decisions of the Department of Commerce involv-
ed questions of national security committed to the Executive Branch, and were therefore
immune from judicial review.
' 15 C.F.R. § 370.11 (1978).
11 1978 COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT. supra note 57, at 9-10. In its complaint in
Daedalus Enterprises, Inc. v. Kreps, discussion supra note 128, Daedalus asserted several
instances of misinformation by the Commerce Department. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY. May 30,
1978, at 0-3. See also the problems encountered by Cyril Bath Co. reported in U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY, June 13, 1978, at A-3.
" See Export Administration Act Agenda for Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (1978) (statement of J. Gray).
13 See note 128 supra.
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national interest, competing in importance to the need to control
sales of strategic exports. A regulatory system structured to
subordinate economic welfare to foreign policy in every instance
risks betrayal of the national interest by failing to consider
whether the cost of trade restrictions is worth the expected gain
in security.
Existing legislation should be amended to allow more informed
participation by license applicants by requiring a full explanation
of the issues raised by the application, opportunity for reply by
the exporter, and an explanation of the specific factual basis of the
denial of any application. Enactment of H.R. 4034 would be a
positive step toward injecting fairness and accountability into the
export regulation process. If combined with the stronger restric-
tions of S. 737 concerning foreign policy controls, H.R. 4034 would
begin the needed reorientation of United States export control
policy.
Audrey S. Winter
Richard Carlson
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